ABSTRACT Three-factor mutually authenticated key agreement protocols for multi-server environments have gained momentum in recent times due to advancements in wireless technologies and associated constraints. Several authors have put forward various authentication protocols for multi-server environment during the past decade. Wang et al. recently proposed a biometric-based authentication with key agreement protocol for multi-server environment and claimed that their protocol is efficient and resistant to prominent security attacks. The careful investigation of this paper shows that Wang et al. protocol's users are sharing personal identifiable information with the application servers during the registration and authentication process. This nature of disclosing credentials leads to severe threats particularly insider attacks, user impersonation attacks, and server impersonation attacks. As a remedy of the aforementioned problems, this paper proposes a novel biometric-based mutually authenticated key agreement protocols for multi-server architecture based on elliptic curve cryptography. We prove that the proposed protocol achieves secure mutual authentication property using the broadly used Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic. The formal security of the proposed protocol is verified using the widely accepted automated validation of Internet security protocols and applications tool to show that our protocol can withstand active and passive attacks including the replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. The proposed protocol is robust and efficient compared with the existing related protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
The tremendous advances in wireless communication technology and communication handheld devices bring new types of supervision risk on a daily basis. Mobility, work flexibility, device diversity and improved teamwork across global enterprises have altered the risk outline and challenge existing distributed computing architectures. The problem is to let people have the flexibility they require for the finest production while ensuring the security and fulfillment required by the organization. To function at high performance and compete within the global market, organizations allow their users to access resources irrespective of their geographical locations and accessing methods more than ever before -but the resulting growth of work places, types of users and accessing ways have driven security policies to the breaking point. Data and resources are the main assets for any organization and the users. Therefore, data protection is becoming necessary for every participating entity. This will be accomplished only through authentication as this is the key step for safeguarding information and defying threats [1] .
Cryptographic authentication is a secure practice of transferring credentials to determine someone, in fact, who they are proclaimed to be and providing authorization to access the services subsequently [1] . In a network environment, the server authenticates the user and vice-versa which is called mutual authentication. In this way, network users can be assured that they are doing business exclusively with legitimate entities and servers can be certain that all would-be users are attempting to gain access for legitimate purposes. Mutual authentication is gaining acceptance as a tool that can minimize the risk of online fraud. Typical authentication can be obtained in distinctive ways namely knowledge factors (passwords), possession factors (tokens) and inherence factors (biometrics) are some well-known methods [2] . Key establishment is another important step in a cryptographic authentication protocol after a mutual authentication process. During key establishment, the communicating parties can compute a common session key which secures the subsequent communication via open channels [3] . The whole abovementioned process is called as Mutually Authenticated Key Agreement (MAKA).
In 1981, Lamport first proposed a password-based authentication protocol that designed on a one-way hash function [4] . But, their protocol maintains user verification tables with password resetting process and requires many hash computations which are said to be shortcomings of Lamport's protocol. Later on, a series of authentication protocols based on passwords alone were proposed [5] - [7] . Conversely, the shortcomings of passwords such as weak password, elusiveness, guessing attacks and so on have imposed to make password-based authentication method stronger by adding smartcards [8] - [11] .
The smartcard with password based authentication methods are widely deployed due to aspects like low cost, userfriendliness and robustness. In this method, the user is expected to insert the smartcard and enter the corresponding password in order to gain access to the system. In 1991, Chang et al. proposed an authentication protocol based on password and smartcard that works on Chinese Remainder Theorem [12] . Since then various improvements have been accomplished to the key idea of smartcard based protocol [13] - [20] . However, research has shown that the password with smartcard based authentication methods are still vulnerable when the smartcard is stolen and the stored data is leaked out [21] - [25] .
The ascribed limitations of password and smartcard based authentication methods have been required to add a third factor called biometrics. Biometric keys (palm print, iris, finger print, face etc.) are much more secure compared to the other two factors due to their uniqueness, non-forgeability and non-transferability. Few modern authentication protocols have used smartcards, biometrics or both along with passwords [26] - [31] .
On the other hand, earlier authentication protocols are bounded for single-server environments. With the massive augmentation of different networks, electronic devices and applications, it is exceedingly complex for users to maintain a variety of credentials for each server. To cope up with above statements, we require robust mutual authentication protocols for multi-server environments with reasonable computational and communication costs. Remote authentication protocol for multi-server environment was introduced by Li et al. [32] in 2001. During the past decade, several authors have proposed various authentication protocols for multiserver environment based on two-factors [33] - [38] and threefactors [39] - [51] . Authentication protocol for multi-server environment can facilitate effective solutions for the shortcomings of single-server environment due to the following facts:
• Remote users are waived from registration process at each individual application server.
• Users can register only once at control/registration server and can obtain the services from all associated servers.
• Users are not required to carry the credentials or the smartcards for each individual server.
A. RELATED WORKS
This subsection provides the summary of Three-factor Mutually Authenticated Key Agreement (3MAKA) protocols for multi-server environment. In 2010, Yang and Yang [39] introduced a biometric password-based multi-server authentication protocol with smartcards. Their protocol requires lots of computations and is prone to insider attacks. In 2011, Yoon and Yoo [40] put forward a three-factor authentication protocol for multi-server environment based on elliptic curve cryptography. Later on, He [41] in 2011 & Kim et al. [42] in 2012 proved that Yoon et al.'s protocol cannot resist masquerade attacks, insider attacks, stolen smartcard attacks and off-line password guessing attacks. Kim et al. [42] further proposed a biometric based authentication protocol for multi-server protocol, which was found to be lacking user anonymity and correctness in the login and password changing phases. In 2014, Chuang and Chen [43] proposed an anonymous three-factor multi-server authenticated key agreement protocol. Their protocol is constructed mainly on one-way hash function which makes it suitable for real time applications. Unfortunately, Mishra et al. [44] in 2014 & Lin et al. [48] in 2015 pointed out several weaknesses of Chuang et al.'s protocol such as lack of user anonymity, susceptible to server spoofing attacks, stolen smartcard attacks, user impersonation attacks, denial-of-service attacks and session-key compromise. Then, they proposed an improved protocols over Chuang et al.'s protocol. However, Lu et al. [49] in 2015 & Wang et al. [52] in 2016 stated that Mishra et al.'s protocol is exposed to user and server masquerading attacks, replay attacks, forgery attacks, denial-of-service attacks, lack of perfect forward secrecy and user anonymity.
Lu et al. [49] VOLUME 5, 2017 put forward various authenticated key-agreement protocols for multi-server environment based on biometrics. Above three protocol involves registration center in the authentication phase which makes them inefficient due to overwhelming calculations at registration center. Additionally, Odelu et al. [50] asserted that He et al.'s protocol has drawbacks in login and password change phases and is also prone to impersonation attacks. Jiang et al.'s protocol cannot provide user anonymity and makes it prone to trace attacks.
In 2016, Reddy et al. [51] cryptanalyzed Lu et al.'s protocol and showed the weaknesses such as prone to impersonation attacks, man-in-middle attacks, clock synchronization problem, lack of user anonymity and lack of perfect forward secrecy. Then they proposed an improved robust protocol built on elliptic curve cryptography.
Most recently, Wang et al. [52] proposed another three-factor authenticated key agreement protocol for multiserver environment. We have cryptanalyzed this protocol and shown the flaws such as lack of anonymity, vulnerability to impersonation attacks, insider attacks and clock synchronization problems.
B. SCOPE AND CONTRIBUTIONS
The main aim of the proposed protocol is to achieve mutual authentication amongst the user and the server with few computations in short time. The proposed protocol is built using elliptic curve cryptographic point multiplications, one-way hash functions, exclusive-OR and concatenation operations. This protocol contains eight phases: 1) registration server initialization phase, 2) application server registration server phase, 3) user registration phase, 4) login phase, 5) mutually authenticated kay-agreement phase, 6) password and biometrics changing phase, 7) dynamic addition of application server phase, and 8) user revocation/re-registration phase. The mutual authentication of the proposed protocol is proved using the BAN logic and the formal security is verified using the AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) tool. The formal and informal security analyses and the performance analysis proves that the proposed protocol is secure and efficient compared to the related protocols. The working procedure of this protocol is detailed in section 5.
The distinguished features of the proposed protocol are as follows:
• Users does not share their credentials in the plain form during the registration phase of the proposed protocol. This property avoids the privileged insider attacks.
• The proposed protocol attains mutual authentication without sharing the personal identifiable information with participating entities unlike other related protocols. Due to this nature, the proposed protocols accomplishes resistance to prominent attacks such as man-in middle attacks, and also user and server impersonation attacks.
• The proposed protocol is compared to the relevant qualified protocols in terms of security properties, computation cost, and communication cost in order to show its effectiveness.
• In the proposed protocol, users can access any application server irrespective of their geographical location which makes them greatly worthwhile for various applications such as e-commerce, e-business, e-documentation, e-healthcare, etc.
C. MODEL OF ADVERSARY
An adversary is who attempts to gain unauthorized access to a genuine sources and benefits from such attempt. In a protocol environment, adversary can perpetrate either active attacks or passive attacks on the transmitted messages over insecure channels and tries to gain access after impersonating a legitimate entity. Every protocol will be evaluated under the assumption of resistance ability to the attacks carried out by adversary. This paper also evaluates the deliberated protocols while considering following adversary model.
• Adversary is assumed to have control over the public channel where the parties communicate with each other. This offers to intercept, alter, and erase any communicated message.
• Adversary is able to read or extract the parameters that are stored on a stolen smartcard issued to user.
• Adversary may perform offline password guessing attacks using the obtained sensitive information from the smartcard.
• Adversary may also try to gain access to the authorized system with the stolen smartcard while constantly guessing the credentials. This would be much easier in the case of low-entropy passwords.
• Adversary may trace the actions of a particular user when any of the transmitted parameters is constant.
• Adversary at server side can obtain the sensitive information of registered users in case if it maintains verification tables.
• Adversary may try to discover long-term keys using the obtained previous session keys which could result in failure of perfect forward secrecy.
• This paper omits the assumption of malicious terminals where the smartcard data and the user credentials are compromised. This is an extreme-adversary model which can break any kind of authentication protocol irrespective of the level of security provided.
D. ROADMAP OF THE PAPER
This paper is organized in eight sections as follows. 
A. SERVER REGISTRATION PHASE
An application server (S j ) can join the network after registering at registration center (RC) as shown below.
Step 1: S j sends a join request message to RC in order to become authorized server of the network.
Step 2: RC adds S j to the network and replies with the PSK via a secure channel by applying the Key Exchange Protocol (IKEv2).
Step 3: Here onwards, S j can act as an authorized server and authenticate the users with PSK and h (PSK).
B. USER REGISTRATION PHASE
A new user (U i ), who wants to access the resources of network, can register at the registration center (RC) as follows.
Step 
and delivers it to U i over a secure channel.
Step 3: U i adds the parameter P i into the memory SC i .
SC i finally contains the information {B
i , C i , D i , V i , P i , h(.)}.
C. LOGIN PHASE
This phase evaluates the correctness of credentials {ID i , PW i , BIO i } entered by U i and decides on further procedure as shown below.
Step 1: U i inserts SC i into the smartcard reader, inputs ID i , PW i and imprints BIO * i at the sensor, which repro-
If the condition does not hold, the process terminates. Otherwise, SC i generates a random number N 1 , and computes
where T i is current timestamp.
Step 3: SC i finally transmits the login request
D. MUTUALLY AUTHENTICATED KEY AGREEMENT PHASE
In this phase, U i and S j authenticate each other and establish a common session-key for further communication over insecure channel as depicted in Figure 1 .
Step 1: Upon receiving the authentication request, S j verifies the validity of timestamp T i with T i − T j ≤ T , where T j is the time when S j received the request.
If it holds, S j retrieves
, and also verifies the condition
Step 2: If the above condition holds, S j generates a random number N 2 , and computes the session key shared with Step 3:
and computes the session key shared with S j as
, and then verifies
Step 4: S j checks the condition
. If the condition holds, S j authenticates U i and commences the communication with the computed session-key.
E. PASSWORD CHANGE PHASE
During this phase, U i can update his/her password without the help of RC using the following steps:
Step 1: U i inserts SC i into the smartcard reader, inputs ID i , PW i and imprints BIO * i at the sensor of a specific terminal, which reproduces R i as R i = Rep(BIO * i , P i ).
Step 2:
. U i is allowed to choose new password only when this condition holds. Otherwise, the process terminates.
Step 3: U i inputs a new chosen password PW new i , and then
, respectively, in its memory.
F. USER REVOCATION/RE-REGISTRATION PHASE
This phase helps U i to revoke his/her privilege or re-registration when he/she loses SC i . When U i wants to revoke, he/she should send revocation request along with RPW i and SC i to the RC via a secure channel. RC verifies the validity of U i and updates < ID i , N i = 0 > in its database. If U i wants to re-register, RC updates < ID i , N i = 1 > in its database and provides the services to U i .
III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF WANG et al.'s PROTOCOL
This subsection keenly observes Wang et al.'s mutual authentication protocol [52] and puts forward severe security weaknesses on this protocol.
Weakness 1 (No Provision of Perfect Anonymity):
Most commonly anonymity on the internet protects the privacy of users by means of unidentifiable names. This property ensures the untraceability of users actions from the attackers. This subsection demonstrates the lack of user anonymity of Wang et al.'s protocol which could result in traceability attack.
During the login phase, U i transmits the message 
However, the timestamps generating clocks in the communicating parties may not be synchronized always. Even a tiny difference in the clocks could result in the rejection of authentication requests.
Weakness 3 (Vulnerable to Privileged Insider Attack):
Researchers from Microsoft have examined reuse habits of passwords on a large set of data attained from more than half a million users during a period of three months [25] . This report shows that each user maintains 6.5 passwords for 25 password required accounts, which indicates same password is used for 3.9 different accounts. In general, usage of same password for more than one site is a common practice for users due to their elusiveness. It could be definitely a potential threat if the users share their passwords in the plaintext form or in the hash digest form without including a random number. During the registration phase of Wang et al.'s protocol, U i submits the registration request
. This typically designates that < ID i , RPW i > are more unique and could lead to perpetration of several attacks by privileged insider of RC in case of the possession of these credentials.
Weakness 4 (Vulnerable to Server Impersonation Attack): In Wang et al.'s protocol, a registered server S j with PSK value turned as an adversary AE can mimic a legitimate server as shown in Figure 2 . During the login and authentication phases, U i transmits the login message
If AE captures this message, he/she can impersonate the server S j in following way. Step 1: After capturing the login message, AE extracts
Step 2: AE generates a random number N AE 2 , and com-
Step 3: Upon receiving the response, Figure 3 .
Step 1: AE generates a random number N AE 1 and computes
Step 2: Upon receiving the login request, Sj verifies the validity of timestamp T AE i with T AE i − T j ≤ T , where T j is the time S j received the request.
If it holds, S j retrieves
. S j treats AE as legitimate U i since this condition holds. S j further generates a random number N 2 , and calcu- 
IV. PROBLEM STATEMENT OF EXISTING MAKA PROTOCOLS FOR MULTI-SERVER ENVIRONMENT
Research has proven that there is always a trade-off between security and usability of an authentication protocol. Some protocols deploys more computations to make it robust, and some uses less computations to make it simple.
Mutual authentication protocols for multi-server environment have practiced either two-party computations or three-party computations in order to accomplish mutual trust amongst communicating parties. The intense scrutiny of the recently proposed protocols have exposed some severe shortcomings as explained as follows.
• Multi-server authentication protocols often use a trusted third party or a centralized server during the authentication process in order to provide authentication and session-key agreement between user and application server. This method provides resistance to any kind of threat and makes it robust indeed. However, this method increases the computational cost and adds the computational burden on third party enormously. Hence, the implementation of this method in light-weight systems is unlikely.
• Most of the two-party computational authentication protocols for multi-server environment have been designed while sharing single secret key with all the registered application servers. Users of some protocols even disclose their authentication credentials with the application servers as evident in the protocols of Lu et al. [49] , Mishra et al. [44] & Wang et al. [52] . This makes the protocol vulnerable to most prominent attacks such as user and server impersonation attacks, and also man-in-middle attacks.
V. PROPOSED 3MAKA PROTOCOL FOR MULTI-SERVER ENVIRONMENT BASED ON ECC
The proposed protocol named as 3MAKA ecc is built using elliptic curve cryptographic point multiplications, one-way hash functions, exclusive-OR and concatenation operations. 3MAKA ecc comprises three participants: user, application server and registration server; and eight phases: 1) registration server initialization phase, 2) application server registration phase, 3) user registration phase, 4) login phase, 5) mutually authenticated key agreement phase, 6) password and biometrics changing phase, 7) dynamic server addition phase, and 8) user revocation/re-registration phase. In 3MAKA ecc , users and application servers join the network after registering at registration server. The mutual authentication procedure carries out between the user and the application server without intervening registration server, which is called the two-party computational MAKA protocol. The various notations used in 3MAKA ecc are listed in Table 2 .
A. REGISTRATION SERVER INITIALIZATION PHASE
The registration server RS generates following parameters in order to initialize the system:
Step 1: RS chooses an elliptic curve E p : y 2 = x 3 + ax + b(mod p) over a finite filed GF(p), where p is a large prime number.
Step 2: RS selects a base point P over E p with an order n and a one-way collision-resistant hash function h(·).
Step 3: RS also selects private keys USK and ASK, and keeps them unrevealed.
Step 4: RS finally publishes the parameters {E p , P, h(·)}. 
B. APPLICATION SERVER REGISTRATION PHASE
A new AS sends a registration request to the RS in order to become an authorized server of the network. The AS registration process occurs via a secure channel as shown in Figure 4 .
Step 1: AS sends registration request < SID A > to the RS securely. Step 2: RS computes K S = h(SID A ||ASK ) and RS stores {SID A , K S } in its database.
Step 3: RS sends < K S , h(ASK), P > to AS securely, which can be used in further phases of authentication.
C. USER REGISTRATION PHASE
A new U i , who desires to avail the services provided by any AS, must register with the RS. Assume that U i obtains aSC with the values {E p , P, h(·)} upon formal request to RS. U i goes after the following steps to register with RS via a secure channel as shown in Figure 5 .
with X S and stores {C U , V U , θ U } on the SC. Thus, the SC finally contains the parameters {X S , V U , C U , T U , θ U , P, h(·), h(ASK)}.
D. LOGIN PHASE
When a user U i wants to access the services of any registered AS, he/she can launch the login request by inserting SC and inputting ID U , PW U and BIO U as detailed in Figure 7 .
Step 1:
and then verifies whether the condition C U ?
= h(ID U ||W S ) holds. If it generates a negative result, the login request is terminated. Otherwise, the list of AS appears on the card reading machine.
Step 2: SC → AS: M 1 =< B US ,D US , α > U i selects the AS which he/she wanted to communicate, SC retrieves corresponding AS's R S value from T U and extracts Q S = R S ⊕ PWD U . SC generates N 1 ∈ Z * p , and computes α = N 1 P, Q S = R S ⊕ PWD U , B US = PID U ⊕ h(SID A ||α||h(ASK)) and D US = h(PID U ||Q S ||α). Note that kP = P + P + . . . + P (k times) denotes the elliptic curve point (scalar) multiplication. The SC launches the login request message M 1 =< B US ,D US , α > to AS via a public channel. 
E. MUTUALLY AUTHENTICATED KEY AGREEMENT PHASE
During this phase, U i and AS authenticate each other and compute a session key for further secure communication over public channel. The entire mutual authentication with key agreement phase is illustrated in Figure 6 .
Step
1: AS computes PID U = B US ⊕ h(SID A ||α||h(ASK )), Q S = h(PID U ||K S ) and verifies the condition D US

?
= h(PID U ||Q S ||α). AS authenticates U i only if this condition holds. Otherwise, the process terminates.
Step 2: AS → SC: M 2 =< E SU , β > AS generates N 2 ∈ Z * p , computes β = N 2 P, K SU = N 2 α, SK = h(Q S ||K SU ||PID U ) and E SU = h(SK ||SID A ||β||α||Q S ), and then sends M 2 = < E SU , β > to SC via a public channel.
Step 3: SC → AS: 
F. PASSWORD AND BIOMETRICS CHANGE PHASE
This procedure is invoked when U i wishes to update his/her existing password or biometrics with new ones. In this procedure, U i can change his/her password PW U or biometrics BIO U by inserting SC and inputting ID U , PW U and BIO U without the help of RS as follows.
Step 1: 
G. DYNAMIC ADDITION OF APPLICATION SERVER PHASE
In this phase, a new application server AS new can join the existing network by sending a registration request to the RS in order to become an authorized server. The new application server's information will be forwarded to the existing users of the network periodically using their stored {PID U , C U } or upon the request for updates from U i . In any of the above two cases, U i is expected to carry out login phase successfully.
The AS new registration process consists of following steps:
H. USER REVOCATION/RE-REGISTRATION PHASE
This phase directs U i when he/she wants to revoke the available services or re-register with different identity. In any of the above two cases, U i is expected to pass through login phase successfully. Both the phases occur via a secure channel as explained below.
1) REVOCATION
During the revocation phase, U i proves his/her legitimacy and submits the acquired SC to the RS. Upon receiving the request, RS sets T R = 0 and updates {PID U , C U , T R = 0} in the table T C , where T R = 0 means U i is revoked and inactive. When U i wishes to resume his/her previous services, U i must prove his/her PID U
by retrieving Q S = R S ⊕ PWD U using the last recent ID U , PW U , and BIO U . If these hold, RS resumes U i 's services and updates {PID U , C U , T R = 1} in the table T C .
2) RE-REGISTRATION
When U i wants to re-register with the new credentials, he/she must prove his/her legitimacy and send the request to RS. Upon receiving the request, RS follows the steps described in user registration phase and updates {PID U , C U , T R = T R +1} in the table T C .
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section presents the informal security analysis and also the formal security analysis of 3MAKA ecc using BAN logic and AVISPA simulation tool.
A. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION PROOF USING BAN LOGIC
The mutual authentication property of 3MAKA ecc is verified with the help of the widely-used Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic [53] . This subsection proves that 3MAKA ecc provides secure mutual authentication between U i and AS.
The following notations are used in formal security analysis using the BAN logic:
• Q| ≡ X : Principal Q believes the statement X .
• #(X ): Formula X is fresh.
• Q| ⇒ X : Principal Q has jurisdiction over the statement X .
• Q X : Principal Q sees the statement X .
• Q| ∼ X : Principal Q once said the statement X .
• (X , Y ): Formula X or Y is one part of the formula (X , Y ).
• P Q : Formula P combined with the formula Q.
• Q K ←→ R: Principal Q and R may use the shared key K to communicate among each other. The key K is good, in that it will never be discovered by any principal except Q and R. In addition, the following four BAN logic rules are used to prove that the proposed protocol provides a secure mutual authentication between U i and AS:
• Rule 1. Message-meaning rule: 
In order to show that the proposed protocol provides secure mutual authentication between U i and AS, we need to achieve the following two test goals:
The generic forms of the transmitted messages between the user U i and the server AS in the proposed protocol are given below:
The arrangement of the transmitted messages between U i and S in 3MAKA ecc to the idealized forms are as follows:
←→AS
Assumptions:
The following are the initial assumptions of 3MAKA ecc :
A1:
Proof: Here, we prove the above test goals in order to show the secure authentication using the BAN logic rules and the assumptions.
• From M1, we have From Goals 1 and 2, it is clear that the proposed protocol provides the secure mutual authentication between U i and AS.
B. INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
Proposition 1: 3MAKA ecc achieves user anonymity and untraceability. Proof: The whole communication of 3MAKA ecc is carried out via insecure channels abide anonymous to active and passive adversaries as outlined following. The transmitted messages < M 1 , M 2 , M 3 > between U i and AS during the login and authentication phases are arbitrary for each session, due to their association with the random numbers N 1 and N 2 . U i 's original identity ID U is encapsulated in the form of B US = PID U ⊕ h(SID A ||α||h(ASK)), where PID U = h(ID U ||r U ) and α = N 1 P. The similar approach is followed in case of all the parameters < B US , D US , α >, < E SU , β >, and < F US > and accomplished user anonymity. 3MAKA ecc also provides another important feature called untraceability. The randomness of all the parameters makes it unidentifiable and untraceable to the adversaries.
Proposition 2: 3MAKA ecc is secure against replay attack. Proof a: AE may try to establish a new session while impersonating a valid user by replaying the previous transmitted message < M 1 >. However, 3MAKA ecc can withstand replay attacks using random number N 1 as explained here. During the login and mutual authentication phase, AS receives the message < B US , D US , α > and stores the pair {PID U , α} in its database. If AE replays the same message < M AE 1 >, AS retrieves {PID U , N AE 1 } and compares with the stored {PID U , N 1 }. When AS finds N AE 1 == N 1 , then it drops the request and terminates the process.
Proof b: In case of the replay attack on response messages < E SU , β > and < F US >, both the parties U i and AS can identify such attempt without tallying the received values likewise in Proof a. The users of 3MAKA ecc are assumed to be not maintaining temporary database to store received random numbers and yet denies replayed requests as following. When AE replays < E AE SU , β AE >, U i computes
It is obvious that the condition cannot hold, since the replayed E AE SU is calculated using previous α = N 1 P, which is different from the current α = N 1 P. In similar way, F US = h(SID A ||α||β||SK ||Q S ) also consists SK, which makes AE impossible to compute F US due to the lack of Q S and current N 1 and N 2 .
Proposition 3: 3MAKA ecc is secure against stolen smartcard attack.
Proof: With the hypothesis that AE can read a SC stored values using various methods as discussed in [21] - [23] , this section describes the resistance of 3MAKA ecc to stolen smartcard attack. Assume that AE is able to read the stored parameters {X S , V U , C U , T U , θ U , P, h(·), h(ASK)} on a stolen legitimate SC. Now, AE may try either launching an authentication request to gain the access to AS or try deriving actual U i 's credentials from the extracted parameters. However, AE undeniably cannot perform any of above actions using these values, since all the important parameters such as
are safeguarded with h(.), where PID U = h(ID U ||r U ) and PWD U = h(PW U ||r U ). AE can neither obtain the credentials nor build an authentication request < M 1 > using the stolen SC due to the unavailability of ID U , PW U and BIO U . At the same time, guessing the ID U , PW U and forging BIO U are impractical. Therefore, 3MAKA ecc can withstand smartcard stolen attack.
Proposition 4: 3MAKA ecc is secure against user impersonation attack.
Proof a: Assume a situation where AE possesses a valid SC and wants to gain network access by perpetrating user impersonation attack. If AE wants to impersonate a legitimate U i , he/she requires to build a login request message
On the other hand, AE should undergo login phase before making authentication request. During the login phase, = h(ID U ||W S ) holds. Unless the AE passes the correct credentials, he/she cannot enter the further phases. Therefore, AE certainly requires legitimate credentials for any likewise computations. However, the probability of yielding correctID U and PW U is negligible. Though the AE performs guessing attacks for ID U and PW U , he/she definitely cannot forge or copy valid U i 's BIO U .
Proof b: 3MAKA ecc does not share much personal identifiable information of U i to any AS. During the login and mutual authentication phase, AS can obtain only PID U of legitimate U i via PID U = B US ⊕ h(SID A ||α||h(ASK)). For instance, if any AS turned as AE wants to impersonate a valid U i , he/she still require K S of the targeted AS to construct Q S = h(PID U ||K S ). In the proposed protocol, Q S value is unique for each AS, where K S = h(SID A ||ASK ). Aforementioned constraints prove that 3MAKA ecc is secure from user impersonation attack.
Proposition 5: 3MAKA ecc is secure against application server impersonation attack.
Proof: Consider a scenario where a genuine AS turned as AE captures < M 1 > and tries to impersonate valid AS by responding with a computed fake message < M AE 2 >. From the captured M 1 , AE can barely obtainPID U = B US ⊕ h(SID A ||α||h(ASK)) when it is assumed of having SID A . In order to compute the response M AE 2 , Q S value of the targeted AS and U i is a prerequisite since each AS of the proposed protocol holds unique long-term key K S , which is again based on SID A as K S = h(SID A ||ASK). Thus, AE cannot compute SK = h(Q S ||K SU ||PID U ), E SU = h(SK ||SID A ||β||α||Q S ) and reply U i . Lets take another case where AE generates a random number N AE 2 ∈ Z * p and computes Proof: AE may try to guess the PW U using the extracted parameters stored on SC{X S , V U , C U , T U , θ U , P, h(·), h(ASK)} or keep trying to login while guessing the PW U . However, AE cannot validate the guessed PW U due to nonavailability of the parameter r U . Then again, r U value is protected with U i 's BIO U in the form of (σ U , θ U ) = Gen(BIO U ), and V U = r U ⊕ h(σ U ) and it is believed to be impractical to forge a valid U i 's BIO U . The AE definitely cannot proceed further without passing correct BIO U resulting in failure of validating the guessed password using and K S are compromised with AE; still AE cannot construct a valid session key due to following reason. The session key is included the parameter
where N 1 and N 2 are random for each session. N 1 and N 2 are unobtainable from α and β due to the fact of ECDLP as explained in preliminaries. Therefore, the session key is considered to be safe even though the long term private key of AS is compromised.
C. FORMAL SECURITY VERIFICATION USING AVISPA TOOL
AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications is a push-button tool for the automated validation of Internet security-sensitive protocols and applications [54] , [55] . AVISPA is a widely-accepted and used tool to formally verify whether a cryptographic protocol is safe or unsafe against passive and active attacks including the replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. In AVIPSA, a security protocol is implemented using HLPSL (High Level Protocols Specification Language). HLPSL is translated using HLPSL2IF translator to convert to the intermediate format (IF). IF is fed into one of the four backends: On-thefly Model-Checker (OFMC), Constraint Logic based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe), SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC) and Tree Automata based on Automatic Approximations for the Analysis of Security Protocols (TA4SP). 3MAKA ecc is simulated under the OFMC and CL-AtSe backends using the SPAN, the Security Protocol ANimator for AVISPA [56] . Both back-ends are chosen for an execution test and a bounded number of sessions model checking [57] . The architecture of AVISPA, and implementation details of the roles of user, server, session, and goal and environment are provided in the supplementary material.
Analysis of Simulation Results: In OFMC backend, the depth for the search is nine and the simulation results are shown in Figure 7 . Also, the total number of nodes searched is 1040, which takes 4.39 seconds. On the other hand, in CL-AtSe backend, 191 states were analyzed and out of these states, 63 states were reachable. Further, CL-AtSe backend took 0.16 seconds for translation. The test results reported in Figure 7 also indicate that 3MAKA ecc is secure against the replay attacks and man-in-middle attacks. It is clear from the simulation results that the proposed protocol fulfils the design criteria and is secure under the test of AVISPA with the bounded number of sessions.
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This section demonstrates the comparison between 3MAKA ecc and the related protocols in terms of various aspects such as security, computation and communication costs. The performance analysis ensures that the proposed protocol is efficient and better in every aspect when compared to other authentication protocols for multi-server environment.
A. FUNCTIONALITY COMPARISON
3MAKA ecc is compared with the related 3MAKA protocols of Mishra et al. [44] , Lu et al. [49] , Lin et al. [48] , He and Wang [46] , Odelu et al. [50] , and Wang et al. [52] with respect to the security properties, and these are shown in Table 3 . It is evident from the table that except Odelu et al.'s protocol and 3MAKA ecc , all the other three-factor protocols are vulnerable to various security attacks whereas 3MAKA ecc can prevent user and server impersonation attacks, and also provides perfect user anonymity, user revocation and re-registration phase.
B. COMPUTATION COST COMPARISON
This subsection compares 3MAKA ecc and the related 3MAKA protocols for multi-server environment in terms of computational cost. We give notations for the involved VOLUME 5, 2017 actions in all the compared protocols as follows: T h : time complexity of a one-way hash function; T p : time complexity of a point multiplication operation on elliptic curve; T e : time complexity of symmetric encryption or decryption function. To evaluate the computational time analysis, we account T h ≈ 0.0023ms, T p ≈ 2.226ms, T e ≈ 0.0046ms as reported in [50] and [58] .
From Table 4 , it is evident that the protocols of Mishra et al. [44] 
C. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD COMPARISON
The communication overheads of 3MAKA ecc protocols and related protocols for multi-server environment are provided in Table 5 . To evaluate the communication costs of the compared protocols, we consider the message digest of SHA-1 hash function of 160 bits length, timestamp of 32 bits length, random number of 160 bits length, 1024 bits modular prime for public key encryption and decryption functions, and elliptic curve point P = (P x , P y ) of (160 + 160) = 320 bits length. Note that 1024-bit RSA public key cryptosystem provides the same level of security as in 160-bit ECC.
From Table 5 , it is evident that the protocols of Mishra et al. [44] , Lu et al. [49] , Lin et al. [48] , He and Wang [46] , Odelu et al. [50] , and Wang et al. [52] , and 3MAKA ecc 's login and authentication phases require 3, 3, 3, 5, 5, 3, and 3 communication rounds, respectively. The required bandwidths in bits are 1280, 1216, 2528, 3520, 2944, 1472, and 1280, respectively. Overall, considering the trade-off among security, communication and computation costs, and additional functionality features, 3MAKA ecc is better than other exiting protocols.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper has conducted an extensive study of the existing mutual authentication protocols for a multi-server environment that are developed based on three-factor methodologies. We have reviewed and cryptanalyzed recently proposed Wang et al.'s 3MAKA protocol for a multi-server environment. It shows that the users are sharing personal identifiable information with the application servers during the registration and authentication process. This nature of disclosing credentials leads to severe threats particularly insider attacks, user impersonation attacks, and server impersonation attacks. As a remedy of the aforementioned problems, this paper proposes a mutually authenticated key agreement protocol for multi-server environment based on password, smartcard and biometrics. The proposed protocol is designed using simple elliptic curve properties, one-way hash function, exclusive-OR and concatenation operations. The proposed protocol is suitable for real-time application due to its design flexibility. The formal and informal security analyses along with the performance analysis prove that the proposed protocol performs better than other related schemes. 
